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Econometric policy evaluation has had a dismal track 
record in recent years, as economists and policymakers 
have been notably unsuccessful in their attempts to pro-
ject the consequences of unprecedented government poli-
cy changes.
1 A theoretical explanation for these failures 
was advanced by Lucas (1976), who pointed out that the 
usage of traditional econometric models is flawed in a 
very serious way. In particular, standard techniques deny 
that economic agents change their behavior when the gov-
ernment changes its policy rules (repeated strategies for 
choosing policy variables). But if economic agents do al-
ter their behavior in the subtle way Lucas described when-
ever government policies change, then techniques which 
ignore these responses cannot correctly project the results 
of policy changes. 
Both recent practical experience and economic theory 
have thus seriously challenged the usefulness of econo-
metric models as guides to evaluating alternative eco-
nomic policies. This does not mean, however, that models 
are useless.
2 It does mean that great care must be taken to 
evaluate alternative policies correctly. 
The key to using econometric models for policy evalua-
tion lies in correctly modeling the relationship between 
economic policy rules and descriptions of agents' patterns 
of behavior. This type of relationship is implied by the 
hypothesis that agents form expectations using all their 
information as best they can, that is, that they have ra-
tional expectations. Taking account of such relation-
ships is hard to do in a large complicated econometric 
model and has yet to be accomplished on that scale. 
However, in what follows, we demonstrate how a very 
simple econometric model can be used to gauge both the 
expected effects of a new policy rule and the range of 
uncertainty surrounding the expected effects. We also 
show that more superficial, shortcut methods aimed at 
accounting for the effects of rational expectations can be 
as misleading as the discredited standard policy evalua-
tion techniques they are meant to replace. 
The Right Way to Incorporate 
Rational Expectations 
Economists have long realized that economic agents' 
expectations, particularly about future government policy 
actions, impinge directly on their current decisions. Typi-
cally, economists have attempted to model this relation-
ship in a very ad hoc way, by using an adaptive mecha-
nism in which the expected value of a variable is deter-
mined from a distributed lag of past values of that vari-
able itself. The rational expectations hypothesis implies 
a more sophisticated economic structure: the coeffi-
cients in equations describing agents' behavior (for ex-
ample, coefficients of supply and demand curves) must 
be explicitly tied in very specific ways to the coefficients 
(or policy parameters) in equations describing economic 
policies. Economists refer to these (perhaps very compli-
cated) ties between the coefficients in a behavioral equa-
tion and the policy parameters as cross-equation restric-
tions. That is, the coefficients of one equation in the 
'For example, as Sargent (1980, p. 16) points out, "Standard Keynesian and 
monetarist econometric models built in the late 1960s failed to predict the effects 
on output, employment, and prices that were associated with the unprecedented 
large deficits and rates of money creation of the 1970s." 
2See, for example, Lucas 1976, Sargent and Wallace 1975, Lucas and Sargent 
1979, Anderson 1978 and 1979, Sargent 1980, and Supel 1980. 
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model (the behavioral equation) must be restricted by the 
coefficients (policy parameters) of another equation (the 
policy rule) in the sense that the former must be made an 
explicit function of the latter. 
The ability of the rational expectations hypothesis to 
deliver appropriate cross-equation restrictions for econo-
metric policy evaluation is the feature that distinguishes 
rational expectations econometric models. We will dem-
onstrate how this distinguishing feature works, using a 
very simple framework and explicit assumptions about 
both the information economic agents have and the way 
they use it to make forecasts. 
The paradigm we will use is a simple two-equation 
model describing the demand for real money balances and 
a rule governing the money supply. This model and the 
forecasts generated from it will represent part of the infor-
mation the monetary authority uses when choosing a 
monetary rule to effect some desired growth in the price 
level. The model is given in terms of the natural logarithms 
of the price level and the money supply,/? and m, respec-
tively, in the relations below: 
(1) mt — pt = -(Etpt+l-p,) + v, 
(2) m, = pm,_! + et. 
Expression (1) is a version of Cagan's (1956) money 
demand equation relating the demand for real money 
balances to the expected rate of price inflation, that is, the 
difference between the price level expected at time t to 
prevail at time t+1, Etpt+X, and the actual price level at 
time t, pr Expression (2) is a simple statement that the 
money supply at time t is determined from the money 
supply at time t-1 through the value of p, the coefficient 
which indexes the monetary rule chosen by the monetary 
authority.
3 The terms v, and e, are random variables 
accounting for the unexplained portions of p, and mn 
respectively.
4 
A policymaker attempting to use relations (1) and (2) 
for econometric policy evaluation needs to solve the 
model in order to derive an expression which can be used 
to predict future values of the price level. In order to do 
this, the policymaker must make some assumption about 
the way the expectation of next period's price level, 
E,pl+l, is formed. Here we assume this expectation is 
formed rationally. 
Imposing rational expectations restricts the form of the 
solutions to the model in very particular ways, and it is 
these restrictions which permit the policymaker to use the 
model successfully for econometric policy evaluation. By 
imposing rationality, we are saying that agents' forecasts 
of future values of the price level are those which are 
produced according to relevant economic theory, equa-
tions (1) and (2) in our framework. The implication is that 
the monetary authority cannot systematically fool the 
public when it changes the monetary rule p, because 
agents know that the rule has changed and they alter their 
expectations of future prices accordingly.
5 
What this means, in terms of our model, is that the 
solution for the price level depends on both the money 




(3) />r =" rnt--vt  2—p 2 
in which, clearly, the coefficient on current money mt is 
intimately tied to the monetary rule p given in equation (2). 
That is, the coefficient 1/(2-p) in (3) is not free, but is 
restricted by the form of the rule described by (2). 
By using (2) directly in (3), we can derive an alterna-
tive, but equivalent, form of the price equation which is 
more useful for forecasting because it gives the current 
price level pt in terms of the known money supply last 
period, mt_x. This relation is 
P .
 1 1 
The complete solution of the model, (4) and (2), clearly 
displays the cross-equation restrictions resulting from the 
3The rationality hypothesis requires that we focus on rules governing the poli-
cymaker's choices of economic policy variables as opposed to isolated actions 
taken by policymakers. In our demonstration here, references to p as the monetary 
rule should be interpreted as a shorthand way of referring to the overall strategy or 
rule which defines the way policymakers choose alternative values of p. This rule is 
quite distinct from isolated, one-time actions which change the existing stock of 
money. 
4 We restrict the value of p to be greater than zero. The disturbances v, and e, are 
each serially uncorrected random variables with mean zero and are uncorrected 
with all past values of the money supply. 
The rational expectation of next period's price level, E,p,+i, is the best linear 
projection of the price level based on the history of both prices and the money 
supply. In our discussion, we do not attempt to deal with the question of how fast 
agents catch on to the rule change; we merely assume that they do catch on, through 
observation or announcement, quickly. 
6The technical details of the exercises described in this article are developed in 
Whiteman 1981. 
7 rationality assumption. Agents' forecasts of future values 
of the price level will be generated using (4), where the 
coefficients are restricted by the monetary authority's 
choice of the monetary rule p. These are the correct 
restrictions in a world of rationality because they are 
derived explicitly from the monetary rule agents know 
about and use to form their expectations. 
The evaluation of alternative monetary rules proceeds, 
in principle, according to the following scheme. First the 
policymaker assumes alternative values of p and uses 
relation (2) to generate alternative sequences of values for 
the money supply m. Then, using these values for m in (4), 
the policymaker generates alternative sequences of values 
for the one-period-ahead price level. Finally, a policy-
maker attempting to effect some desired average rate of 
price inflation over the next T-t periods chooses the value 
of p that produces a projected price sequencepl+l, ...,pT in 
which the best prediction of the price level at time T,pr, is 
p, the target price level consistent with the desired average 
rate of inflation. 
In our model, the forecast of pT will depend on the 
choice of the new rule—say, p0—as well as the current 
money supply ml and the forecast horizon T-t. Therefore, 
if the targeting problem is to try to make pT = p, the 
authority will choose that p0 which equates the model's 
prediction forpT to the target price level,
7 that is, 
p
To lmt _ 
2-po 
= P-
An estimate of the ordinary uncertainty surrounding 
this prediction can be calculated from the properties of the 
residuals in (1) and (2), and this estimate can be used to 
construct a 70 percent confidence interval about the mean 
prediction/?.
8 The calculated confidence interval will also 
exhibit the restrictions imposed by rationality; that is, the 
confidence interval will depend on the value of p0 chosen 
by the policymaker. Assuming that agents quickly catch 
on to the change from the historical p to the new p0, the 
likely range of the actual price level at time T after the 
change in the monetary rule at time t will be given by the 
prediction p and the associated 70 percent confidence 
interval:
9 
1.04 / - + (2—po)~
2 £ Pl
k 
V 4 k=0 
To make our demonstration more concrete, suppose 
that both the money supply and the price level have been 
growing at an average rate of 20 percent per period over 
recent history, that is, that p = 1.2.
1
0
 To simplify the 
arithmetic, further assume that mt= 1. If the policymak-
er's goal were to reduce the average rate of inflation over 
the next T-t periods to 10 percent per period using only 
the monetary rule p, the policymaker would try to find 
that value of p for which the model's best prediction of the 
price level at time T would be 
p = (1.10)
7 
Figure 1 shows the period-by-period projection of the 
price level based on the policy choice p0 as derived from 
the above expression, as well as the 70 percent confidence 
interval associated with the model's best, or mean, predic-
tion each period over the T-t periods.
1
1
 If economic agents 
correctly perceive the rule change and if expectations 
are formed rationally, the restricted model can be success-
fully used to project the consequences of the rule change. 
Figure 1 then shows the best forecasting the policymaker 
could do; the projection correctly characterizes the true, or 
actual, evolution of prices (and the associated 70 percent 
confidence interval at each period) resulting from the poli-
cy change from the historical p = 1.2 to the new p0. 
7It is easy to show that under rationality the reduced form prediction of the 
price level j periods ahead is given by p'm,/(2-p). 
8 A 70 percent confidence interval is, in simplest terms, a range of values around 
a forecast in which the actual value of the projected variable will fall 70 percent of 
the time. The range of values is derived from the uncertainties in the policymaker's 
model. 
9In deriving the confidence interval, we have computed the conditional 
variance from the vector moving average representation, dropping cross terms with 
zero expectation. We have also assumed that the variance-covariance matrix of the 
residual vector (e, v,)' is the identity matrix, a harmless assumption for this 
illustrative example. The residual vector is assumed to be normally distributed. 
Each confidence interval calculated and illustrated in this paper is actually a 
minimum estimate, since in fact the parameters of the reduced form are not known 
exactly, as we have assumed, but must be estimated. In practice, where the vari-
ance-covariance matrix of the residual vector is not known, the 70 percent confi-
dence interval can be computed by drawing repeated realizations of the vector from 
a normal distribution, generating sequences of p and m, and dropping the highest 
and lowest 15 percent values at each 
10Strictly speaking, in our example it is the natural logarithms which have been 
growing at 20 percent per period. 
nFor all of the examples depicted here, the number of periods is T-1 = 18. 
Each time path shown has been detrended for scaling purposes by the reduced 
form projections of the correctly restricted model, (2—p0)
 1 p^m, j = 1,2,..., 18. 
The variance-covariance matrix of the residual vector was scaled to provide stark 
contrasts; that is, the matrix / was scaled by the factor 0.00002231. 
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Figure 1 
Actual Evolution of Prices 
Under the Rational Policy 
(Formulated With Cross-Equation Restrictions) 
Several Misleading Shortcuts 
The key to the successful policy evaluation exercise above 
lies in correctly imposing the cross-equation restrictions 
that rationality implies. Failure to capture these restric-
tions yields predictions and confidence intervals that lead 
to policy choices which result in consequences very differ-
ent from those sought by the policymaker. It is exactly this 
failure which characterizes standard econometric policy 
evaluation. 
Although we have shown in a very simple framework 
how the correctly imposed cross-equation restrictions 
derived from rational expectations can lead to projections 
which can be successfully used for policy evaluation, we 
have been careful to avoid suggesting that incorporating 
these restrictions into large econometric models is a trivial 
matter. Indeed, pioneering work in this area by Hansen 
and Sargent (1980) suggests that the task is anything but 
easy. Unfortunately, it is also true that so far no shortcuts 
to constructing successful econometric policy evaluation 
techniques have been developed. 
Below, in the context of our simple model, we demon-
strate why some of the shortcuts which have been proposed 
simply don't work. Briefly, the reason is that they do not 
correct the shortcoming of traditional methods, that is, 
the failure to account for the cross-equation restrictions 
between behavioral coefficients and policy parameters. 
>4 Shift From Point Predictions 
to Confidence Intervals 
Some have argued that the effect on econometric policy 
evaluation of omitting the correct cross-equation restric-
tions is likely to be small.
1
2
 Those who sympathize with 
this argument seem to think that the effects of alternative 
policies are likely to be captured in the confidence inter-
vals calculated with traditional methods. This strategy is 
actually a reinterpretation, rather than a modification, of 
standard approaches to econometric modeling, a shift of 
emphasis from a model's point, or best, predictions to the 
confidence intervals around those predictions. However, 
as we demonstrate with our simple model, the errors from 
omitting the correct restrictions need not be small and both 
the point predictions and the confidence intervals resulting 
from the use of traditional techniques can be seriously 
misleading. 
Note first that the policymaker using standard tech-
niques has estimates of the money supply rule described 
by (2), just as we had in our example above. However, the 
practitioner of standard methods does not include agents' 
understanding of this rule in their expectations formation 
and thus estimates a relationship between the price level 
and the money supply which looks like this: 
1 
(5) pt = 0mt — -v,. 
The error in using this relationship comes from the failure 
to recognize that the coefficient on current money, 0, is in 
fact actually equal to 1/(2—p), as in (3). In this standard 
framework, the price level and the money supply are 
assumed to be related through the (estimated) historical 
value of 9, regardless of changes in the rule p. 
By using the money supply rule (2) in (5), the policy-
12See, for example, the comments in Modigliani 1978 and in Solow 1978. 
9 maker generates future paths for the price level for alterna-
tive money sequences consistent with different values of p 
according to the following relation: 
(6)  pt = 6pmt.x + 
1 
T" 
Because 6 is assumed invariant with respect to changes in 
p, the projections for the price level from (6) will obviously 
differ from those derived from (4) for particular choices of 
p. As a result, the policymaker solves the targeting prob-
lem, trying to make pT = p, by choosing a different 
monetary rule, pl, which equates the prediction ofpT from 
(6) with/?, that is, 
OpV'm, =P-
The sequence of projections and associated 70 percent 
confidence intervals that the policymaker using standard 
techniques claims for the evolution of future price levels 
pl+l9pl+2, ...,pT is then given by 
0p{mt ±1.04 
4 k= o 
Use of the erroneous 6 parameter obviously invalidates 
not only the projected future price levels, but also the 
confidence intervals associated with them. 
Figure 2 shows the sequence of price level projections 
and confidence intervals claimed by the policymaker 
using standard techniques for the same problem which led 
to the sequence of projections shown in Figure 1. Clearly, 
the sequence shown in Figure 2 for the standard policy p, 
is not the same as that in Figure 1 for the rational expecta-
tions policy p0 (chosen on the basis of the correctly re-
stricted model). Additionally, the confidence intervals 
shown in Figure 2 cannot be interpreted as taking care of 
the uncertainty due to the policy change because, as the 
expression above makes clear, they also fail to reflect the 
policy change correctly. 
Provided agents' expectations are rational, we may use 
the implied restrictions to show that the projected evolu-
tion of the price level claimed above for the policy p, is, in 
fact, not the actual evolution of the price level that would 
result from that policy choice. To see how the error comes 
Figure 2 
Claimed Evolution of Prices 
Under the Standard Policy 
(Formulated Without Cross-Equation Restrictions) 
Log of the 
Price Level 
Time 
about, note that the projection of the price level at time t+j 
claimed above for the policy p, is Op{mn where 6 is 
estimated over some historical period and is assumed to 
be invariant under the change to the new rule p,. Imposing 
the correct cross-equation restrictions implied by ratio-
nality, however, showed that the best prediction of pt+J 
depends on the current money supply and on the new 
policy rule p, in the following way: 
p\mt 
2~Pi 
Thus, under the policy p,, the sequence of predictions and 
70 percent confidence intervals that describes the actual 
evolution of future price levels pl+l,pl+2, ...,pT once agents 
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realize that the new rule is in effect is 
p\mt / 1 
± 1.04 / -+(2-Plr





For the same problem used to generate Figures 1 and 2, 
Figure 3 contrasts the claimed evolution of prices and 
associated confidence intervals for the policy pt (from 
Figure 2) with the actual evolution of prices and confi-
dence intervals for that policy. The contrast is a striking 
demonstration of the thrust of the Lucas critique. Under a 
policy rule chosen using standard techniques (ignoring 
cross-equation restrictions), the actual evolution of the 
price level can differ dramatically from that claimed by the 
policymaker using those techniques and the claimed confi-
dence intervals can be both off-center and of incorrect size 
Figure 3 
Claimed and Actual Evolution of Prices 
Under the Standard Policy 
(Formulated Without Cross-Equation Restrictions) 
Figure 4 
Actual Evolution of Prices 
Under the Rational and Standard Policies 
(Formulated With and Without 
Cross-Equation Restrictions) 
and shape. It is clear that for some values of the historical p 
and the new p„ the claimed and actual confidence inter-
vals need not even overlap. It is also clear that the effect of 
omitting the cross-equation restrictions is neither neces-
sarily small nor likely to be accounted for by appending 
standard confidence intervals to erroneous projections. 
Figure 4 presents further evidence that policymakers 
should incorporate the correct restrictions into their fore-
casting models. The actual range of outcomes under the 
policy rule chosen when the correct restrictions are taken 
into account may differ significantly over the forecast 
horizon from the actual range of outcomes under the 
erroneous policy chosen when the correct restrictions are 
ignored. Clearly, no simple relation between the two paths 
need exist at all, and for this reason policymakers should 
not be surprised when standard techniques lead to results 
11 significantly different from those desired.
1
3 
A Simulation Technique 
Another way of accounting for rational expectations in 
econometric models was suggested by Anderson (1978, 
1979), who used a simulation method to equate a model's 
projection of the path of future prices to agents' expecta-
tions of that path. Anderson was trying to illustrate the 
types of effects that one might expect from policy rule 
changes that agents caught on to very quickly. Unfortu-
nately, some investigators have mistakenly concluded 
that pursuing Anderson's simulation method—which we 
will call a pseudorational strategy—would provide a 
relatively easy shortcut to the results of correctly imposing 
the cross-equation restrictions. As we show below, this 
approach can give projections that are very different from 
the actual evolution of prices under rationality and there-
fore can imply policy rules that are very different from the 
correct ones to reach the policymaker's goals. 
In practice, because of certain timing ambiguities 
which Anderson discusses, there are two choices about 
how to implement the pseudorational idea.
1
4
 The first 
choice is to use relation (5) to generate the expectation of 
next period's price level,Etpt+l, and to substitute this re-
sult into equation (1) to obtain 
1 
Pt = 0'mt --v, 
where 6' = (1 + Op)/2. However, now 0' is assumed to be 
invariant under changes in the rule p, and therefore the 
same types of problems which invalidated the first short-
cut method will invalidate this approach too. 
In our framework, the second way to implement the 
pseudorational idea amounts to replacing Etpt+1 in equa-
tion (1) with the actual price level next period,p[+l. Thus, 
(1) becomes 
(1')  mt -pt = - (Pt+i-Pt) + h>, 
where w, is the unexplained residual. Rearranging gives a 
solution for next period's price level as 
pt+l = 2 p, — mt + w, 
in which it is clear that next period's price level, pl+l9 is 
known exactly in the current period t.
15 The appropriate 
solution procedure is to begin with the targetpT =p and to 
solve backwards from time T for the price and money 
sequences. The policy rule is found by determining the 
value of p—say, p2—which equates the model's best pre-
diction ofpTto the objective/?, that is, the solution to
1
6 




Clearly, this expression is very different from that de-
rived when expectations are formed rationally and agents 
130ne approach to modifying standard techniques that we don't explicitly deal 
with here, but which might be viewed as a response to Lucas' critique, is to 
construct models as if the true coefficients were random in nature and to use this 
property in calculating forecasts and confidence intervals. An excellent example of 
this approach is described in Swamy and Tinsley 1980. In our framework, the 
standard technique is modified by characterizing 6 and p as having probability 
distributions and by updating the characterization of these coefficients for each 
period over which the model is estimated or used to predict. The information 
contained in this approach—about both the uncertainty surrounding the mean 
projections and the nature of the change in the coefficients and forecast error 
variability over time—could possibly be useful to policymakers. 
However, on at least three grounds this strategy fails to salvage traditional 
methods of econometric policy evaluation. First, as Lucas emphasized in his 
critique, either randomness or drift observed in coefficients is merely a symptom of 
the basic failure to roll back econometric models to the levels where parameters do 
remain invariant, and this approach therefore fails to address the main thrust of the 
critique. Second, since the approach ignores the cross-equation restrictions, it does 
not appear to correct the mean, or best, conditional forecasts from standard 
techniques in ways which reflect the effects of policy changes. Thus, even if 6 and p 
in our model are characterized as truly random, the mean forecasts generated will 
not be the correct ones consistent with the cross-equation restrictions. Third, this 
approach fails to capture in a clear way the effects of a specific policy change, since 
it characterizes any definite structural change (such as a decision to change p from 
its historical value to the new p,) as one that with only some (perhaps small) 
probability may occur. 
14See the discussion in Anderson 1979, pp. 71-73. 
15In our framework, we can derive an explicit solution which is equivalent to 
the results that would be obtained from model simulations. 
16In the solution presented, p is constrained to be less than 2 in absolute value. 
The forecast and associated 70 percent confidence interval for the price level j 













2 are the variances of the disturbance terms e and v, respectively. 
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Figures 5 and 6 
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Time  Time 
catch on to monetary rule changes quickly. That is, the 
pseudorational approach does not deliver, in our model, 
anything that even vaguely resembles the solution from 
correctly imposing the cross-equation restrictions. 
To demonstrate the results of this strategy, we have 
used the same problem posed earlier. Figure 5 shows the 
claimed evolution of the price level using the rule implied 
by the pseudorational strategy. Not only does the price 
sequence differ dramatically from that projected in the 
correctly restricted case (see Figure 1), but the 70 percent 
confidence interval essentially explodes. This happens 
even though we have been charitable by assuming that the 
forecaster correctly knows that the coefficient on the 
expected price level, Etp[+l, is -1. In fact, as Anderson 
observes, this coefficient is typically estimated incor-




Just as we demonstrated earlier for prices under the 
policy choice px made using standard techniques, we can 
show that the claimed evolution of the price level under the 
pseudorational rule p2 is not the path prices would actu-
ally take under that monetary rule. Figure 6 shows, for our 
illustrative problem, what the actual evolution of the price 
level and the associated 70 percent confidence intervals 
are under the pseudorational policy choice. Clearly, the 
actual future sequence of prices would surprise the poli-
cymaker who chose p2 on the basis of the pseudorational 
technique's projected future path. 
Finally, in Figure 7 we contrast the actual evolution of 
the price level under the pseudorational policy p2 with the 
actual evolution under the rational policy p0. The implica-
tion is clear: a policymaker cavalierly relying on the pseu-
dorational simulation strategy as a policy guide is likely 
17See Anderson 1979, pp. 69-71. 
13 Figure 7 
Actual Evolution of Prices 
Under the Rational 
and Pseudorational Policies 




to be dramatically misled. This technique is therefore no 
shortcut to correctly imposing the required cross-equation 
restrictions on a policymaker's model. 
An Estimation Technique 
Still another shortcut that some investigators seem to be 
pursuing uses future values of the variables about which 
expectations are formed to estimate the model over some 
historical period. Alternative future scenarios are then 
characterized by plugging in alternative future sequences 
of the variable about which expectations are formed. 
Although this procedure is typically applied to a policy 
variable like the money supply, rather than to a variable 
like the price level, we can use our framework to demon-
strate the pitfall in this type of approach. Here the inves-
tigator characterizes (1) as 
(1")  ~Pt = ~P(Pt + \ ~Pt) + HY 
where fi is estimated over some historical period for which 
the sequence of one-period-ahead price levels is available. 
Once the model is rearranged to give a solution forpt9 the 
coefficient p can be estimated. The best estimate of that 
coefficient in this falsely restricted equation is ft=0.
18 The 
resulting price and money relation is then 
pt = mt + error 
instead of the correct relation given in (3). In fact, the 
relation given here is correct only in the case where p = 1. 
Thus, estimating a relation like (1") for econometric 
policy evaluation really amounts to the same thing as 
forecasting both by not imposing the cross-equation re-
strictions (p is not a function of p) and by using a wrong 
characterization of the monetary rule (p is made to equal 1 
exactly). 
Conclusion 
Econometric models can be formulated in a way that will 
make them useful for policy evaluation, though the job has 
not been accomplished yet. The challenge is to formulate 
and imbed correctly in an econometric model the types of 
cross-equation restrictions implied by the assumption that 
agents form their expectations rationally. We have dem-
onstrated in a simple case how a correctly restricted model 
can be a useful guide to policy choices. We have also 
shown why attempts to impose these restrictions on larger 
models should continue: methods proposed to circumvent 
this complicated procedure lead to incorrect policy choices 
and so are likely to be as counterproductive as the defec-
tive standard approaches they are intended to replace. 
I8The maximum likelihood estimate of ft is 0, but it is the false restriction and 
not the particular estimation procedure that delivers this result. 
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